Constitutional Reform to Curb the Power of the President
By Richard Neifeld, Neifeld IP Law
I. Introduction
The preamble of the United States Constitution identifies its goals are "to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence [sic], promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." However, an inexorable shift of political power from the states to the federal government, and within the federal government from Congress and the courts to the presidency, leads me to conclude that the US Constitution requires specific changes to prevent a president from becoming a king by allocating more power to Congress and less to the president. These changes further the goals of the constitution by rejecting totalitarianism and dictatorship, and promoting government stability.
Section II summarizes a process for constitutional amendment. Section III identifies what I perceive to be defects in the US Constitution and Supreme Court precedents, and specifies constitutional amendments to correct those defects. Section IV asks for your active support to accomplish this reform.
II. Constitutional Amendment Process
Article V of the Constitution specifies that the Constitution can be changed by two thirds votes in favor in both the House and Senate, followed by approval by three fourths of legislatures of the states. Unites States Code 1 U.S.C. 106(b) is titled "Amendments to Constitution." This law places administrative procedure over the processing of the amendments in the Archivist of the United States. The process begins with the introduction of a resolution in Congress, specifying the proposed amendments. The amendment must be passed by two thirds votes in each chamber, and then ratified by three quarters of the state legislatures for ratification.
The president plays no part and has no role in this process.
III. Seven Sets of Amendments to the Constitution to Curb the Power of the Presidency
The subsections below identify powers accorded the president, why according those powers to the president is a defect, and specific amendments addressing those defects.
I summarize those defects and amendments here.
1. Executive power - The Constitution now vests all executive power in one person, without any actual control over how that person executes that power. That is a defect. The resolution to this defect is the transfer of certain executive powers to Congress.
First, transfer to Congress both the prosecutorial powers and the pardon powers.
Second, transfer to Congress power to strip selected additional executive powers from the president and vest those additional powers in Congress. As Congress, not the president, sees fit.
2. Commander in chief powers over the army and navy - The Constitution makes the president command in chief of the Army and the Navy. The resolution of this defect is to broaden that power to encompass all US military forces, and cabin that power to include only US military forces.
3. Commander in chief powers over state militias - The Constitution grants the president unconstrained command in chief powers over all state militias, without territorial limitation. The resolution of this defect is to impose a territorial limitation by providing state governors control over the use in their own territories of state militias.
4. Presidential privileges and immunities - The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to inherently provide the president complete privilege and immunity. The resolution of this defect is twofold. First, expressly strip the president of all such privileges and immunities.
5. Presidential power to order use of military force - Congress has unconstitutionally ceded to the president the power to make war. The resolution of this defect is to prohibit the president from ordering use of military force on an enemy except during the time that Congress has declared we are at war with that enemy.
6. Congressional power of impeachment - The Constitution provides Congress a generally unattainable and impractical power to remove any of the thousands of officers of the US government. The resolution of this defect is lowering the threshold for impeachment and conviction, and authorizing Congress to delegate impeachment of junior officers.
7. State court power to disqualify oath breakers from office - In 2024, the Supreme Court held that a state court could not bar any adjudged insurrectionist and oath breaker, Trump, from being on the ballot in that state. This defect can be fixed by overruling the Supreme Court by Constitutional amendment allowing a state to do just that.
8. Presidential power to fire officers and withdraw from treaties - As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the president's power to fire senior officers and break treaties is unconstrained. The solution to these defects is to expressly require advice and consent of the Senate to both hire and also fire senior officers, and expressly required advice and consent of the Senate to both enter into and also withdraw from treaties.
1. Executive power
Article I, section 1, reads:
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
Article II, section 1 reads:
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.
Article II, Section 2, first paragraph now reads:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
The executive power problem
All executive power vested in a single person is too great a power to vest in one person. This is so because the power can easily be used to subvert the wishes of the courts and congress, leading to dictatorship. For example, by ordering officers in the executive branch to indict and arrest judges, members of congress, and election officials, who could otherwise restrain the president's power, grant pardons to those following illegal presidential orders, and control agencies whose independence from politics currently provides substantial benefits to the United States.
The egregious prosecutorial power problem
Trump has in fact caused his justice department to investigate and indict those on his enemies' list, including sitting US senators, state and federal prosecutors, and the former head of the FBI. The perceived regulatory safeguards against presidential control over the DOJ that were imposed as a consequence of Watergate have evaporated. This problem is particularly dangerous because it facilitates a slide into autocracy and dictatorship by suppressing political opposition and freedom of speech.
The egregious pardon and reprieve power problem
The pardon and reprieve power is also particularly dangerous in the hands of a president because the president can use that power as incentive to induce others to commit crimes in exchange for personal or partisan gain, and reward rather than punish bad behavior.
Trump used this power to pardon people to benefit his personal interests, including pardoning: corrupt officials, January 6 rioters, wealthy fraudsters, and anyone that supported Trump's presidencies. Not that Trump was the sole bad actor. Biden used this power to pardon his own son. Ford used this power to pardon Nixon. George Bush used this power to pardon the Iran-Contra conspirators. All of these pardons weakened the rule of law by allowing a President to use the power to pardon and reprieve for personal and partisan gain, contrary to the strong interest of the United States in upholding its rule by law.
The independent agency problem
Congress and the president have agreed via legislation over the decades to create certain agencies that are not subject to direct control by the president. These are called quasi independent agencies and they include the Fed, SEC, FCC, and NLRB. Congress and the presidents agreed to set up these agencies as quasi independent of the president for good reasons. Because that independence provides perceived benefit to the citizens of the United States. The Supreme Court is likely to strike down quasi independent agencies, placing them under direct control of the president.
Solution to these problems
Solutions to these defects in the Constitution are to strip the prosecutorial powers, and the pardon and reprieve powers from the president, and vest them in Congress, and also to vest congress with the power to strip any other executive power from the president and vest that power in Congress.
Under this proposal, Congress would be empowered to take direct control of the Department of Justice, or make it a quasi independent agency. And Congress could strip from the president of any powers the president may now have over so-called quasi independent agencies so that they were in fact independent of presidential control. And Congress would have the power to delegate its new executive authority, for example the selection and governance of executives of all such departments and agencies in any manner Congress so chose. For example Congress could appoint an independent board to directly appoint executives of those agencies, to further remove Congress from the potential for partisan meddling.
Proposed amendments implementing these solutions
Proposed amendments to the Constitution that strips the prosecutorial power, pardon and reprieve powers, and any other power Congress decides to strip from the president, and conferring those powers on Congress, reads as follows:
Article I, section 1, replace "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." with "All legislative Powers herein granted, all powers to prosecute, all powers to pardon and reprieve, and all other executive powers that Congress strips from the president, shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. The Congress of the United States shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."
Article II, section 1 replace "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." with "The President shall have all executive power of the United States of America, except for the prosecutorial power, the power to pardon and reprieve, and any other executive power that Congress strips from the president."
Article II, Section 2, first paragraph, delete the clause ", and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment".
2. Commander in chief powers over the army and navy
Article II, section 2, first paragraph reads:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
Limited constitutional grant of power problem
The reference to only the army and the navy is deficient because US military forces now consist of more than an army and a navy, including the army, marine corps, navy, air force, space force, and coast guard, and the president should clearly be the commander of all armed forces of the United States.
Solution to this problem
The solution to this problem is to formally clean up the language by referring to military forces.
Proposed amendment implementing the solution
A proposed amendment to the Constitution correcting this defect reads as follows.
In Article II, Section 2, first paragraph, replace "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States" with "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States."
And it may be necessary to define the armed forces to be those forces authorized by Congress to use force outside the geographic boundaries of states of the United States.
3. Commander in chief powers over state militias
The term in Article II, Section 2, first paragraph's recitation "the Militia of the several States" refers to any military force organized by a state to defend that state. The power granted to the president regarding those militias is that the president is their "commander... when called into the actual Service of the United States."
What it means to be "called into the actual Service of the United States" imposes no limit on the purpose for which they are called into service. This broad term provides no basis for a state to resist use of their own military force by the president.
The problem with unconstrained presidential command of state militias
This grant of power is undesirable because a power hungry president could abuse this power for example by having the state militias interfere with elections. For example, the president could call up the state militias to prevent the timely setup of certain polling places, to impose obstacles to voting, to prevent certain classes of people from voting, and to detain and arrest opposition politicians. This power enables the president to prevent the collective will of the people in choosing their representatives. Trump has abused this power by calling up state National Guard to police the streets of US cities against the wishes of the elected officials including mayors and governors for those cities.
Solution to this problem
A proposed amendment to the Constitution removes the president's unilateral power over state militias by limiting his power to command state militias only during declared wars and upon request of the governor of a state requesting assistance.
A proposed amendment implementing the solution
In Article II, Section 2, first paragraph change the recitation ", and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States" to ", and of the Militia of the several States only (1) from when Congress declares a war against an enemy until Congress declares that war against that enemy has ended and (2) from when a governor of a state in which the militia is to be deployed has authorized their presence until that governor terminates that authorization".
4. Presidential privileges and immunities
A first problem with these privileges and immunities is that they empower the president and his officers to commit illegal acts for any reason, resulting in dictatorship.
By way of example, in 1974, the Supreme Court denied the president executive privilege for the Nixon White House Tapes. That denial of privilege ultimately led Nixon to resign because it forced Nixon to produce the tapes showing he conspired to break the law by committing burglary of the headquarters of the Democratic party. Back then, a president committing burglary was an impeachable offense. And Nixon was about to be impeached and convicted. He resigned to avoid that disgrace. This shows how important the absence of presidential immunity is. Barring this absence of immunity, any president could squash his political opponents, like Nixon tried to do, rapidly leading to a dictatorship.
Yet, in 1982, the Supreme Court granted the president absolute civil immunity for official acts. And then in 2024, the Supreme Court granted the president absolute immunity from criminal prosecution relating to official acts, and absolute executive privilege on evidence of those crimes, thereby effectively also precluding criminal prosecution of his officers.
The consequence of the privileges and immunities, granted to the president by the Supreme Court, is that they make the president tantamount to king. For our democracy to thrive, these privileges and immunities must be revoked.
As to president Trump, I believe that this president has commanded his minions to commit illegal acts. I believe that this president has extended beneficial policies and terms to US states, foreign countries, companies, and individuals in exchange for kickbacks. I believe that this president has imposed blanket tariffs, contrary to constitutionally granted power and statutory law, and then has used the tariffs as bargaining chips to cut deals which personally benefitted the president and his close associates. All of these actions are anathema to a government for the people, bedrocked in a rule by laws. Deals should benefit the people, not the president.
These privileges and immunities empower a president to commit illegal acts for any reason, including self dealing, attacking political enemies, undermining free and fair elections, undermining the judicial system, and undermining the rule of law generally.
The remedy for these defects is to strip the president of these privileges and immunities.
These defects can be resolved by the following proposed amendment:
Article II, Section 1, at the end of the section, add the following new paragraph:
The president shall have no privilege or immunity to civil or criminal proceedings relating to his official acts as president.
5. Presidential power to order use of military force
A second problem with these privileges and immunities is that they empower the president to order the US military to use force without a Congressional declaration of war, thereby usurping the will of the American people.
The Constitution grants Congress the sole power to declare war. However, since the end of WWII, Congress ceded more and more of this power to the president. As a consequence, the boundaries between war and peace have been blurred, and the president has repeatedly ordered the use of military force in ways that violated the letter and intent of the Constitution. The result has been legal chaos and untold costs in blood and treasure, wasted on wars the American people never approved including the second gulf war and the Vietnam war.
The consequence of the president's minimally constrained use of military force has been a huge cost to the US, by any measure. Consider for example the financial costs and outcomes of the larger uses of US military force, and how the power of the president evolved, since WWII.
Shortly after WWII, Truman ordered US military action in Korea, but only after North Korea invaded, and the US promptly obtained support in the United Nations and funding for this war from Congress.
At its peak, the Korean war cost the US about 14% of GDP. The outcome of that war was a draw. Both South Korea and North Korea exist. However, North Korea continues to attempt to threaten the US homeland will nuclear attack. As a consequence, the US has spent tens of billions of dollars for missile defensive specifically to counter North Korean ballistic missiles. And the US spends annually about 0.01% of GDP for US military forces stationed in South Korea.
To our great detriment, the Korean war set a disastrous precedent for future presidential use of military force without requiring Congress first declaring a war.
Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all ordered use of US military force in Vietnam.
At its peak in 1968, the Korean war cost the United States 9.5% of GDP.
For the first Gulf War, in response to Iraq invading and conquering Kuwait in a territorial and resources grab, Congress did not formally declare a war. Instead, it passed an authorization for the first president Bush to use military force.
At its peak, the first Gulf War resulted in the US expending about 0.3% of GDP. However, the cost of the first gulf war was mostly offset by financial donations to the US from other countries.
For the Afghanistan War, in response to Al Qaeda committing the 9-11 attacks on the United States and Al Qaeda being shielded by the Taliban government in Kabul, Congress did not formally declare a war on Afghanistan, the Taliban, or Al Qaeda, but it did pass an authorization to use military force therefore in 2001. That war cost on average 0.64% for the first few years, and then drifted down to about 0.24% by 2018.
For the second Gulf War, in response to arguments (which were not true), by the second president Bush, that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons and conspiring with Al-Qaeda to commit terrorism, Congress authorized use of military force against Iraq in 2002, but, again, it did not issue a declaration of war. The second Bush president ordered US military to use force against Iraq, toppling Saddam Hussein and standing up a local government. At its peak in 2008, this war cost the United States 1.0% of GDP.
I do not list the cost in blood, but of course each war had a blood cost, which US servicemen paid. And I am humbled by their service and sacrifice. I cite the GDP figures only to quantify the costs to the United States of these undeclared wars.
Congress has avoided issuing a declaration of war, and likely would not have done so in the cases of Vietnam and the second Gulf war. Exactly because many congress members were skeptical of the basis for these wars but were afraid to voice their skepticism by voting against an actual declaration of war. For fear of the president’s wrath. If the president had less power, that wrath factor would be reduced. And these wars might have been avoided.
These defects can be resolved by the following proposed amendment:
Article II, Section 1, at the end of the section, add the following new paragraphs:
The president shall only have power to order the use of US military force against an enemy from the time Congress has issued a declaration of war on that enemy until Congress has issued a declaration that the war on that enemy has ended.
6. Congressional power of impeachment
Article I, section II, fifth paragraph provides for impeachment. It reads:
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.
Article I, section 3, paragraph 6 provides for conviction of an impeached Officer. It reads:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.
Article I, section 3, paragraph 7 provides the consequences for conviction of an impeached Officer. It reads:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.
Article II, section 4, provides the basis for removal of all officers of the US government by impeachment and conviction. It reads:
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
The problems with impeachment
The problems with impeachment as specified by the Constitution are that it is virtually impossible to achieve, and overly burdensome on Congress. And does not compensate the United States for harm caused by the crime. This is because the procedure is so burdensome, consuming the time of the entire Congress, because the threshold for conviction is so high, and there is no provision for compensation. As a consequence, it is an ineffective remedy for the harms it is supposed to address.
There have been a total of 22 impeachments by the House of Representatives. 15 of federal judges, 4 of presidents, 2 of cabinet secretaries, and 1 of a US senator. Of these, only 8 federal judges were ever convicted, 3 other judges resigned before the senate reached a verdict, and 1 president (Nixon) resigned when impeachment and conviction were imminent.
The senate votes on the presidential impeachments, were as follow.
Andrew Johnson, for attempting to replace an appointed official without consent of the senate in violation of a law specifically requiring senate consent.
Clinton, 45-55 (guilty-not guilty) on perjury.
Clinton, 50-50 (guilty-not guilty) on obstruction of justice.
Trump, first impeachment, on abuse of power 48-52 (guilty-not guilty).
Trump, first impeachment, on Obstruction of Congress 53-47 (guilty-not guilty).
Trump, second impeachment on incitement of insurrection, 57-43 (guilty-not guilty).
The presidential impeachments show that, even when a majority vote to convict, the president remains in office. That is an undesirable outcome because there always exist some amount of purely partisan actors that will never convict one of their own party, regardless of proof of criminal activity. And knowing this, even senators that might otherwise vote to convict, fear doing so because of the anticipated personal repercussions in case there is no conviction.
Therefore, the bar of a two thirds super majority is too high.
Proposed solutions to make impeachment effective and a proper remedy
These defects can be removed by providing Congress the power to delegate impeachment and conviction of junior officers (anyone other than the president, vice-president, and cabinet secretaries), to reduce the threshold for conviction to a mere preponderance of the voting members, and to provide for compensation to the United States in cases where the convict profited from their abuse of power of the US government.
Proposed amendments implementing this solution
A series of proposed amendments to the Constitution that implements these changes read as follows.
Amend Article I, section II, fifth paragraph, to read "The House of Representatives shall chose their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. Congress may pass laws enabling the House of Representatives to delegate this power for impeachment of junior officers."
Amend Article I, section 3, paragraph 6 to read as follows:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside over the trial. Congress may pass laws enabling the Senate to delegate this power for trying impeached junior officers. Conviction requires concurrence of more than half the present members of the Senate, or more than half the present members of any tribunal trying a junior officer.
Amend Article I, section 3, seventh paragraph reads:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Except, in case of a finding of pecuniary gain by the convict as a consequence of the convicted crime. When such a finding is made, the tribunal will determine, or will delegate determination of the amount of pecuniary gain, and the tribunal will collect or delegate collection of that amount, which collection will become property of the United States.
7. State court power to disqualify oath breakers from office
The fourteenth amendment, section 3, reads as follows:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Problem with the disqualification provision
In December 2023, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Trump was ineligible for the presidency because he had committed insurrection, pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, section 3. However, in 2024, the Supreme Court reversed that ruling, holding that states could not determine eligibility for federal office under this Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a consequence, Trump remained on the ballot in Colorado.
This Supreme Court decision allows an adjudged insurrectionist to run for federal office, even when a court of competent jurisdiction has found as a matter of fact the person committed insurrection. This decision strengthens the presidency, and increases the chance that insurrections, like the one that Trump instigated, will reoccur.
Solution to the Supreme Court's neutering of the disqualification provision
This defect can be fixed by overruling the Supreme Court by Constitutional amendment. A proposed amendment fixing this defect and clarifying that this provision applies to the president, while preventing a ruling in a state court from being effective in all states, reads as follows.
Replace the fourteenth amendment, section 3, with the following:
No person shall be President, Vice-President, a Senator or Representative in Congress, an elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
The finding of a court of a state that a candidate has committed insurrection disqualifies that candidate in that state, from appearing on a ballot in that state for any state or federal office, and from holding any office of that state.
8. Presidential power to fire officers and withdraw from treaties
The Constitution, Article II, Section 2, second paragraph reads:
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
The problems with advice and consent
The Constitution requires advice and consent of the senate for making treaties with foreign nations, appointing Ambassadors, Ministers, Consuls, and Judges of the Supreme Court. But the Constitution contains no provision requiring the advice and consent from the senate in breaking treaties or firing Ambassadors, Ministers, Consuls. Consequently, Ambassadors, Ministers, Consuls serve at the pleasure of the president, which means policy implementation changes every time we elect a new president, and because the Ambassadors, Ministers, Consuls have a reason to be more loyal to the president personally than to the Constitution. This cause instability in US policy and action and subverts fealty to the Constitution.
These defects are a major factor in instability in the government of the United States. Every time a new president comes in to office, federal agencies are hamstrung because their executives are automatically lame ducks, subject to immediate dismissal. And replacements, due to the vetting process and delays in Senate votes, consumes substantial time. That results in at least a temporary vacuum of power in the US government.
The Supreme Court previously ruled that laws limiting the president's power to fire senior officers were unconstitutional. Therefore, the only mechanism to address that defect is by constitutional amendment.
Proposed solution, requiring advice and consent of the senate to break treaties and to fire senior officers
The solutions are to require senate approval. Requiring Senate to approve the US withdrawal from a treaty will provide certainty in the eyes of other nations and in this nation that treaties into which we enter are enduring. Requiring Senate approval for dismissal of senior officers would provide for continuity of government when administrations change, and also prevent executives in the US government from being more loyal to the president than to the US Constitution.
Proposed amendment implementing these solutions
A proposed amendment correcting these defects reads as follows.
Revise Article II, Section 2, second paragraph, as follows:
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of at least two thirds of the present members of the Senate, to make, to modify, and to terminate Treaties.
He shall have Power to nominate or recommend dismissal, and the senate the power to appoint or dismiss by a concurrence of a majority of the present members of the senate, Ambassadors, Consuls, and Ministers.
He shall have Power to nominate, and the sent the power to appoint by a concurrence of a majority of the present members of the senate Judges of the supreme Court and all lesser courts.
He shall have Power to delegate nomination of all other inferior Officers of the United States, except for those Appointments herein otherwise provided for in this Constitution, and those Appointments established by Law.
Appointment and dismissal of those nominated to be inferior officers requires concurrence of a majority of the present members of the Senate, unless Congress has by Law vested the Appointment and dismissal of such inferior Officers, in the President, in the Courts, or in the Heads of Departments.
IV. Petition Your Congressional Representatives to Enact These Changes
Your role in this process is to petition your congressional representatives to act. If you agree with any of these proposals, petition your congressional representatives and state legislatures to approve them.
You can find contact information for your congressional representatives here: https://www.congress.gov/members